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The Doha Development Agenda:  
Asian challenges and prospects after the  
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China
The Doha Development Agenda is the first “round” of multilateral trade negotiations under the World 
Trade Organization and is also the first time that multilateral trade talks have explicitly sought to focus on 
the interests of developing countries. Developing Asia therefore has much at stake in the talks and has 
a strong interest in a positive and ambitious outcome. The key areas of market access negotiations are 
in industrial products, agriculture, and services. Each area raises distinct issues and nuances for various 
groups of developed and developing countries. In addition, the Doha Agenda includes the rules governing 
contingent forms of protection and regional trade agreements. Finally, “aid for trade” and trade facilitation 
are part of the agenda. Asia has a vital interest in multilateral liberalization prospering in the Doha talks.
Introduction
The Doha Development Agenda constitutes the ninth trade “round” 
since the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1947, and the first under the aegis of the GATT successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Box 1.5.1). It is also the first set of 
multilateral negotiations that are intended to focus on issues of interest to 
developing countries. 
There is a great deal at stake for Asia at Doha. First, given the 
outward-oriented policy strategy that essentially all Asian countries now 
embrace, the region relies increasingly on a vibrant, open international 
marketplace. All sectors currently being negotiated under the Doha 
Development Agenda are relevant to the economic prosperity of 
the region, including manufactures, agriculture, services, and trade 
facilitation measures. Many of these areas have hitherto been neglected 
or ignored completely in earlier rounds of negotiation, suggesting a 
unique opportunity for the region. Bringing down peak tariffs (known as 
“mega-tariffs” at Doha) in manufactures and pervasive obstacles to trade 
in agriculture are particularly important to Asia. Better rules governing 
the comportment of WTO member states in regulating trade will also be 
extremely useful. Developing member states have often been the target of 
contingent protection (i.e., antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and 
the like). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has recently been the most 
obvious target of such actions, but it certainly is not alone: practically all 
developing member states have been subject to antidumping duties. Better 
rules are even more important now that Asia has become extremely active 
in creating its own web of free trade areas, for improved rules could lead 
to better agreements and less policy distortions.
Second, the potential negative effects of the recent surge in free trade 
1.5.1 A brief history of the 
World Trade Organization: From 
GATT rounds to Doha
The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was signed in 
1944, with the immediate objective 
of preventing future trade wars and 
inconsistent commercial policies 
that had plagued international 
trade in the 1930s. It was origi-
nally intended to be a temporary 
body: the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) was supposed 
to replace it as a permanent body 
with international legal status, on 
par with other Bretton Woods insti-
tutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank. ITO was never ratified; 
however, GATT came into effect on 
1 January 1948 as an ad hoc orga-
nization that would only have its 
existence enshrined in a permanent, 
legal form in 1994, with the cre-
ation of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO).
The raison d’être of GATT was 
to reduce international barriers 
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areas, discussed at length in Part 3 of Asian Development Outlook 2006, 
will be amplified in the case of a Doha failure. This is likely for two 
reasons: (i) the more liberalized the global economy, the less the potential 
impact of discrimination inherent in free trade areas; and (ii) a failure at 
Doha could (and, most likely, will) lead to considerable disillusionment 
with the multilateral system, and starting a new set of negotiations would 
probably only be possible in the medium or long term. Regionalism and 
bilateralism will continue to be important with or without a successful 
conclusion to Doha. However, if there is no progress at the multilateral 
level, these preferential trade agreements will no doubt fill the void. This 
scenario could create spheres of influence and trade blocs that could 
easily work to the region’s detriment. 
Third, since a country will generally gain more from its own 
liberalization, a positive outcome at Doha would facilitate domestic 
reform and restructuring, as well as open foreign markets and create 
a more level trade “playing field.” Negotiators consider offering tariff 
reductions as a bargaining chip that is only to be given in exchange for 
something in return. It is, therefore, ironic that almost all simulations 
of trade liberalization in a global context show the more protected 
economies gaining much more than the more open ones. Hence, a 
successful Doha Round would show greatest gains in agriculture for the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US), whereas developing 
countries would generally gain more through their own liberalization 
of manufactures (Anderson and Martin 2006). One can expect that 
ultimately Asian countries with the highest trade barriers will tend to 
gain the most through liberalization.
A fourth and related point regards support for the national economic 
reform programs of Asian countries. The linking of a broad array 
of sectors in a concerted, international framework of liberalization 
negotiations under WTO tends to give greater political clout to those 
favoring more open trade. Hence, WTO sets in motion a political-
economy dynamic that makes liberalization easier than, say, on a 
unilateral basis. 
Finally, like GATT/WTO negotiations before it, the Doha 
Development Agenda will be critical in setting the stage for deeper 
liberalization in future rounds. 
However, Doha negotiations have not been smooth sailing. Indeed, 
the waters have been more frequently choppy than smooth. In large part, 
this is a reflection of the complicated nature of the WTO talks, at which a 
wide variety of sensitive issues have been put on the table, including such 
areas as agricultural export subsidies; domestic support for agriculture; 
tariff reductions; and harmonization in labor-intensive manufactured 
goods, trade in services, antidumping duties, and rules governing regional 
trading agreements. 
Indeed, the oft-cited difficulties of Doha are in part a reflection of 
previous successes in multilateral negotiations: earlier GATT rounds 
were able to reduce considerably tariffs on nonsensitive manufactured 
goods, leaving the most difficult items to be tackled. Moreover, the 
nonuniformity of cuts in tariffs and nontariff barriers resulting from 
compromises in earlier GATT rounds has been problematic because they 
can create their own distortions.1 Further, the exigencies of globalization 
to trade on a nondiscriminatory 
(or “most-favored nation”) basis. 
The modality to do this would be 
through concerted, multilateral 
negotiations called “rounds.” Since 
the creation of GATT, there have 
been eight rounds, i.e., Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1947–48; Annecy, 
France, 1949; Torquay, United 
Kingdom, 1950–51; Geneva, 1956; 
the Dillon Round, 1960–62; the 
Kennedy Round, 1963–67; the 
Tokyo Round, 1973–79; and the 
Uruguay Round, 1986–93. The 
ongoing WTO negotiations have 
been dubbed the Doha Devel-
opment Agenda, with the intention 
of underscoring the importance of 
developing countries in this series 
of talks. 
Earlier GATT rounds were suc-
cessful in reducing tariffs on manu-
factured goods. The Uruguay Round 
began to address more complicated 
issues, from quantitative restrictions 
in sensitive areas like agriculture and 
textiles and clothing to trade-related 
areas such as investment measures 
and intellectual property protection. 
The Doha Development Agenda was 
initiated to go further down the road 
of “deep” integration. The process 
has been difficult, given the political 
sensitivity of many of the key areas 
being addressed. In fact, the 2003 
Ministerial Meeting in Cancun 
ended without any agreement.
The Ministerial Meeting in 
December 2005 held in Hong Kong, 
China was successful in keeping 
the Doha negotiations alive. WTO 
members agreed to undertake lib-
eralization negotiations generally 
under four pillars: Non-Agricultural 
Market Access; Agriculture; Services; 
and Rules (such as those pertaining 
to administrative actions, e.g., anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, 
and regional trade agreements). This 
meeting reemphasized the primacy 
of the “development dimension” to 
the talks. The leaders have set April 
2006 as the deadline for the Doha 
package. 
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require far more extensive liberalization packages than in the 
past. 
No doubt another complicating factor concerns the 
necessary emphasis on developing countries, which are 
extremely diverse and often have different priorities and 
interests. The least-developed countries (LDCs), in particular, 
face a complicated situation. The LDCs require open 
international markets in order to boost growth and reduce 
poverty—and, so, a successful Doha Development Round 
would help achieve this. However, as they benefit from 
preferential access to developed-country markets for the lion’s 
share of their exports, a good Doha deal will inevitably have 
the effect of reducing this advantage (“preference erosion”), 
a process that is being exacerbated by the trend toward 
regionalism. Doha is seeking a way to compensate them for 
this (under the “aid for trade” rubric). 
In any event, the going has been tough, and at some 
points, it seemed as if the talks would fail. The successor 
to the Uruguay Round was originally intended to be 
launched in Seattle in December 1999, rather than in Doha 
in November 2001. The Seattle debacle is well known. The 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting in September 2003 ended in 
failure as well, and the negotiations were saved only in July 
2004 when a framework agreement for negotiations (the 
“July Package”) was finalized. Hence, while many believe that 
the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China in December 
2005 could have gone much further in terms of ambition and 
progress in defining modalities of liberalization, others were 
relieved that the talks are at last moving forward. 
Asia can serve as a key protagonist at Doha. Given 
the less than stellar progress in negotiations, leadership in 
fostering a proactive approach in all areas under discussion 
is essential. As one of the most open regions in the world 
whose outward-oriented development strategy has been 
highly successful, Asia can contribute significantly in this 
regard. Moreover, active participation of Asian countries will 
ensure that the sectors and rules deemed most important to 
the region will be included in the final package. In addition, 
Asia is able to overcome the (usually counterproductive) 
division between “north” and “south.” Most countries in Asia 
subscribe to the same types of outward-oriented policies, and 
while the region does have divergent interests, differences are 
not generally drawn along north-south lines. 
In short, Asia has a strong interest in a positive outcome 
at Doha. The goal of this section of Asian Development 
Outlook 2006 is both to summarize the ongoing Doha 
negotiations, which should be completed in 2007 at the 
latest, and to consider the negotiations’ implications for the 
developing member countries of the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB). First, the evolution of the Doha negotiations 
is considered, followed by a review of the liberalization 
1.5.1 ADB developing member countries and WTO
Joined 
WTO
2005 
population 
(million)
2005 
GDPpc1 
(US$)
2005 
GDPpc2 
(US$)
WTO members, as of December 2005
Myanmar 1995 54.80 1,417.0 106.8
Nepal 2004 25.30 1,471.2 247.5
Cambodia 2004 13.80 2,116.0 371.2
Bangladesh 1995 137.00 1,997.9 401.2
Kyrgyz Republic 1998 5.14 2,061.0 455.5
Solomon Islands 1996 0.48 1,922.5 583.6
Papua New Guinea 1996 5.66 2,414.2 585.5
Mongolia 1997 2.55 2,045.5 671.3
India 1995 1,107.00 3,315.7 686.6
Pakistan 1995 153.96 2,549.3 777.3
Armenia 2003 3.22 4,048.1 1,077.6
Sri Lanka 1995 19.68 4,144.7 1,110.8
Philippines 1995 85.24 4,770.2 1,111.2
Indonesia 1995 221.26 3,939.5 1,232.5
PRC 2001 1,310.00 6,193.4 1,461.6
Maldives 1995 0.30 7,639.5 2,465.9
Thailand 1995 65.30 8,542.4 2,562.8
Fiji Islands 1996 0.83 6,282.1 3,206.5
Malaysia 1995 26.70 11,159.6 5,110.4
Taipei,China 2002 22.65 27,512.8 14,447.0
Korea 1995 48.29 22,665.7 16,492.9
Hong Kong, China 1995 6.94 32,292.2 24,714.9
Singapore 1995 4.35 28,228.0 26,252.7
Observers
Tajikistan 6.77 1,373.3 368.6
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 5.61 2,049.0 456.5
Uzbekistan 26.00 1,834.4 419.3
Viet Nam 83.10 2,782.2 567.5
Bhutan 0.77 3,329.8 801.9
Azerbaijan 8.44 4,500.3 1,434.9
Vanuatu 0.21 3,415.4 1,487.1
Samoa 0.19 6,389.9 1,820.9
Tonga 0.10 7,689.9 2,141.7
Kazakhstan 15.17 8,252.4 3,592.3
Afghanistan 24.70 - -
Non-WTO Members
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 0.83 - 371.6
Kiribati 0.10 2,590.9 686.7
Turkmenistan 6.59 7,854.0 3,516.3
Marshall Islands, Rep. of 0.06 - -
Micronesia, Fed. States of 0.11 - -
Palau 0.02 - -
Tuvalu 0.01 - -
Cook Islands 0.02 - -
Nauru - - -
Notes:
GDPpc1 = GDP per capita at purchasing power parity;  GDPpc2 = GDP per 
capita at current exchange rates.
Sources: World Trade Organization, available: http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; International Monetary 
Fund, available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2005/02/data/
dbginim.cfm; Asian Development Outlook database.
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strategies currently being discussed. The subsequent section offers some 
estimates of the economic effect of Doha on the region’s economies. 
Finally, prospects for the global system after Doha are considered. 
Key issues in the Doha Development Agenda
The majority of ADB developing member countries are WTO members. 
Of the rest, a little over half have applied to join and are at various phases 
in the accession process; Viet Nam should join in 2006. Table 1.5.1 presents 
ADB developing member countries by increasing order of per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP)2 and offers details regarding when (or if) 
they joined WTO. These countries are quite dispersed among the many 
existing coalitions, a reflection of the diversity in trade regimes in the 
region (Table 1.5.2). Columns 1 to 5 of Table 1.5.2 present the coalitions that 
are centered on developing countries’ role in WTO. These countries tend 
to seek exemptions from various WTO disciplines and commitments for 
their members, e.g., the “Least-Developed Countries” (LDC) group, the 
“Small and Vulnerable Economies” (SVEs) coalition, and the “Like-Minded 
Group” (LMG). Columns 6 to 9 focus on coalitions ranked by their position 
on agricultural liberalization, from a group that opposes liberalization 
(G10) to one that promotes open global markets (the Cairns Group).3 
There follows a brief survey of the key issues articulated at the 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, namely Non-Agricultural 
Market Access (NAMA), Agriculture, Services, and Rules. Select aspects 
of the Doha Development Agenda of particular interest to developing 
Asia, i.e., aid for trade and trade facilitation, are stressed. 
Non-Agricultural Market Access 
As noted above, trade in manufactures has been the traditional area 
of focus at previous multilateral rounds, with considerable success: 
developed-country tariffs tend to be quite low on average in this area. 
However, tariff levels in developing countries continue to be quite high 
(though they also have come down considerably over the past 10 years); 
hence, there is considerable asymmetry in tariff levels between countries, 
as well as across sectors within countries. 
An important facilitating format established at the Ministerial 
Meeting in Hong Kong, China was the agreement to use the 
“Swiss formula” (Box 1.5.2) as the main vehicle of liberalization and 
harmonization under NAMA. The beauty of the Swiss formula lies in its 
simplicity: negotiators need only to agree on one element of the formula 
(the reduction factor); the rest of the process is automatic and completely 
transparent. And there is no need to have a common reduction factor 
for all economies; several reduction factors could be used, with such 
indicators as per capita GDP determining which reduction factor could 
be applied to which country group. It allows the process to eschew the 
definition of what is a “developing economy” and to apply “special and 
differential treatment” (SDT), a concept that was not only accepted but 
emphasized at the Hong Kong, China meeting. The Swiss formula’s 
transparency and simplicity also empower even the least-developed 
member states to participate actively in the negotiations. 
From an economic point of view, the Swiss formula cuts higher tariffs 
1.5.2 The “Swiss formula” and 
Doha
The process of reducing tariff discrep-
ancies between countries, as well as 
within countries, is known as tariff 
harmonization. As the main goal of 
Non-Agricultural Market Access is to 
reduce and harmonize tariffs between 
countries, the Ministerial Meeting 
in Hong Kong, China approved the 
adoption of the “Swiss formula,” which 
was first introduced by Switzerland and 
subsequently adopted during the Tokyo 
Round (1973–79). Such harmonization 
is effective not only in reducing global 
tariffs and making them more even 
across the board but also in avoiding 
unintended distortions stemming from 
divergent tariff levels within coun-
tries (the “effective rate of protection” 
problem). 
The simple Swiss formula is 
expressed as T = [rt/(r+t)] where 
t refers to initial tariff rates, T the 
post-negotiation tariff rates, and r 
the reduction factor (there is also 
a “weighted” version of the Swiss 
formula that combines each country’s 
tariff average with the reduction factor, 
but the Ministerial Meeting in Hong 
Kong, China did not specify which 
type should be used). 
An example might illustrate how 
the Swiss formula would both har-
monize and reduce tariffs. Suppose 
there are two countries, A and B, 
who apply tariffs on automobiles of 
150% and 10%, respectively. Further, 
suppose that the reduction factor (r) 
is 25 (“Swiss 25”) and the period of 
adjustment would be over 6 years. 
At the end of the tariff reduction 
period, country A would have a 21.4% 
(= 150x25/150+25) tariff on automo-
biles, whereas country B would have 
a 7.1% (= 10x25/10+25) tariff. Hence, 
while there would continue to be a 
discrepancy, the country A tariff would 
fall to only three times that of country 
B, whereas before liberalization the 
corresponding difference was 15 times. 
Moreover, tariffs have fallen across the 
board.
The key question, of course, relates 
to what the reduction factor should be. 
Doha Development Agenda negotiators 
are currently working out possible 
options. 
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1.5.2 Membership of ADB member countries in WTO coalitions and other country groupings
G77 LDC G90 SVEs LMG G10 G33 G20 Cairns ACP CIS
WTO Members, as of December 2005
Nepal 1 1 1
Cambodia 1 1 1
Bangladesh 1 1 1
Kyrgyz Republic 1
Solomon Islands 1 1 1 1 1
Mongolia 1 1 1
Pakistan 1 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1
Papua New Guinea 1 1 1
Sri Lanka 1 1 1
Philippines 1 1 1 1
Armenia 1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1
PRC 1 1 1
Maldives 1 1 1
Thailand 1 1 1
Fiji Islands 1 1 1 1 1
Malaysia 1 1 1
Taipei,China 1
Korea 1 1
Hong Kong, China
Singapore 1 1
Myanmar 1 1 1
Observers
Tajikistan 1
Lao PDR 1 1
Uzbekistan 1
Viet Nam 1
Bhutan 1 1
Azerbaijan 1
Vanuatu 1 1 1
Samoa 1 1 1
Tonga 1 1
Kazakhstan 1
Afghanistan 1 1
Non-WTO members
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of 1 1
Turkmenistan 1
Kiribati 1 1
Marshall Islands, Rep. of 1 1
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1 1
Palau 1 1
Tuvalu  1         1  
Cook Islands 1
Nauru 1
ACP = African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; Cairns = a group of agricultural exporting nations lobbying for 
agricultural trade liberalization; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; LDC = least-developed countries 
(as defined by the United Nations); G10 = a coalition of countries lobbying for agriculture to be treated as 
diverse and special because of nontrade concerns; G20 = a coalition of countries pressing for ambitious 
reforms of agriculture in developed countries with some flexibility for developing countries; G33 = a group of 
countries advocating that developing countries be granted flexibility to self-designate a number of “special 
products” on which they would not have to make any tariff reduction or tariff-rate quota commitments; 
G77 = a coalition of developing countries G90 = coalition of African, ACP, and least-developed countries; LMG 
= Like-Minded Group (a loose coalition of WTO members with similar concerns about the WTO agenda); SVEs 
= small vulnerable economies. 
Source: World Trade Organization, available: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_
e/brief25_e.htm.
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by more than the smaller tariffs. By doing so, it enhances economic 
benefits from trade liberalization in two ways: it delivers higher welfare 
gains than in the case of, say, a straight-line approach,4 and it may 
improve tariff revenues.5 Moreover, from a political point of view, the 
Swiss formula tends to reduce domestic bickering regarding post-
liberalization tariffs between domestic vested interests because it does not 
change the ranking of the domestic protection by industry, though it does 
reduce differentials. 
The tariff structures of 18 countries actively involved in the Doha 
negotiations are summarized in Table 1.5.3. As these countries together 
account for over three fourths of world GDP, a deal between them has 
the potential to trigger a successful outcome of the Doha Development 
Agenda. Table 1.5.3 is based on the detailed tariff rates available at the 
Harmonized System six-digit level (HS6) of disaggregation, usually 
including some 4,000 products. It differentiates “bound” tariff rates,6 
above which a country cannot raise its tariffs, from “applied” tariff rates, 
i.e., those that were in effect as of 2001. Negotiators focus on bound 
tariffs; to the extent that the bound tariffs exceed the applied tariffs, 
there is said to be “water” in the tariffs. Water in the tariffs is spread 
widely across WTO member states. This is problematic; if a formula has a 
country reduce its (bound) tariff to a level that is above the actual applied 
tariff, it will have no effect on trade. 
Table 1.5.3 shows that the developed countries have little to offer in 
the NAMA negotiations, as their tariff structures are characterized by 
low bound and applied tariffs, with the exception of “mega-tariffs,” i.e., 
products with tariffs of 20% or higher. The developed countries also tend 
to have far less water in their tariffs. Hence, it is clear that the developed-
country negotiators are keen to promote liberalization in NAMA (as 
“demandeurs,” in WTO-speak) and certain developing countries’ 
negotiators are less anxious to do so (as “demandées”). The compromise 
would have to be in the developed countries offering up more in 
agriculture, services, and certain aspects of “rules” (discussed below).
As previously noted, the compromise is an ironic one. Developing 
Asian countries resisting NAMA cuts have the most to gain from 
an ambitious Swiss formula, as liberalization would lead to greater 
welfare gains due to their higher levels of protection. Such a “sacrifice” 
is the economic equivalent of “crocodile tears.” Still, negotiators view 
“concessions” as negotiating chips, which they hope will be successful 
in eliciting “sacrifices” from developed countries under agriculture. 
Successful negotiations lead to a “prisoner’s delight” scenario in which all 
countries gain, though not due to the intentions of the negotiators (who 
tend to focus on the interests of producers alone). 
In the 2004 July Package, negotiators agreed on “flexibility” 
provisions, with the intent to take into account the “special needs and 
interests of developing countries.” A first provision refers to longer 
implementation periods; this approach is traditional in GATT/WTO 
negotiations and so is not particularly controversial. The two other 
provisions are much more complicated, that is: (i) the possibility of 
excluding a certain percentage of total import value from the formula 
cuts; and (ii) the possibility of excluding a certain percentage of tariff 
lines from the formula cuts. Critics stress that these two flexibility 
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1.5.3 Uruguay Round tariffs, selected countries
  Total 
number of 
tariff lines 
(HS6)
 All tariffs  Mega tariffs (higher than 20%)  Maximum tariffs
Average 
applied 
tariff
Average 
bound 
tariff
Average 
tariff 
water
Number of 
tariff lines
Average 
applied 
tariffs
Average 
bound 
tariffs
Average 
tariff water
Maximum 
applied 
tariff
Maximum 
bound tariff
Maximum 
tariff water
Number of 
prohibitive 
tariffsa
Industrial economies
Japan 4,327 1.6 2.3 0.8 16 17.1 23.8 6.7 25.0 28.5 13.3 0
US 4,428 2.6 3.4 0.8 47 20.7 26.0 5.3 33.1 38.6 21.3 0
EU 4,441 3.9 4.0 0.0 17 23.1 24.1 1.0 42.8 57.5 14.7 1
Canada 4,427 3.3 5.3 2.0 25 14.9 21.3 6.5 20.1 25.0 25.0 0
Australia 3,911 3.5 11.0 7.4 506 13.7 34.7 21.0 25.0 55.0 45.0 101
New Zealand 4,095 3.1 11.1 8.0 1,208 8.2 26.5 18.3 40.0 45.0 40.0 0
Developing economies
PRC 4,330 9.1 9.2 0.1 286 24.4 24.6 0.2 50 50 5.9 3
Korea 4,347 6.7 10.2 3.5 336 13.2 30.4 17.3 30.0 36.8 28.8 0
Singapore 4,306 0.0 4.1 4.1 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 10.0 10.0 2
Taipei,China 4,266 4.5 4.7 0.2 50 25.4 27.4 1.9 40.0 60.0 22.5 0
South Africa 4,247 8.3 11.0 2.8 1,082 24.7 29.1 4.4 60.0 60.0 32.1 72
Malaysia 4,247 8.6 11.2 2.6 1,467 21.4 25.9 4.5 215.6 300.0 100.2 18
Philippines 4,053 9.2 16.7 7.4 1,877 13.9 26.5 12.6 40.0 50.0 47.0 127
Thailand 3,522 13.4 20.2 6.8 2,247 17.1 27.0 9.9 80.0 80.0 50.0 24
Brazil 4,233 15.1 29.4 14.3 3,768 16.1 31.4 15.3 35.0 85.0 72.5 1
Mexico 4,374 17.2 34.8 17.6 4,316 17.4 35.1 17.8 50.0 50.0 47.0 76
Indonesia 4,229 8.3 35.0 26.6 3,861 8.7 37.6 28.9 80.0 125.0 125.0 21
India 3,736 33.9 37.0 3.1 3,504 35.9 39.2 3.2 52.0 150.0 108.0 715
Least-developed countries
Bangladesh 4,437 21.7 22.7 1.0 2,391 31.6 33.4 1.9 37.5 200.0 200.0 62
a Defined as tariff rates higher than 50%; n.a. = not applicable. HS6 = Harmonized System six-digit level.
Note: Country classification is based on the Integrated Tariff Analysis System.
Source: Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2004, An Integrated Tariff Analysis System: Software and Database, Productivity Commission Staff Working 
Paper, available: http://www.pc.gov.au/research/swp/itas/itas.pdf. 
provisions could undermine the negotiating, economic, and political 
advantages of the Swiss formula.7 It certainly would not be to the 
advantage of developing Asian countries.
Without a successful conclusion to NAMA talks, the Doha 
negotiations will not progress. Also, the ultimate substance of NAMA 
will be critical to the effectiveness of Doha and in setting the stage 
for future WTO negotiations. While NAMA needs to be ambitious in 
cutting tariffs, it is essential that it be symmetric in its applications. It 
could absolve the system of many of its past sins by creating a far more 
uniform tariff structure within and between countries. The structural 
adjustment that will result from such a process will make future WTO 
rounds that much easier. The Swiss formula approach offers an excellent 
opportunity to do this. However, a “flexible” compromise in which sectors 
are excluded could significantly reduce the potential gains from Doha, 
postpone once again liberalization in key sectors, and set another bad 
precedent for future rounds. 
Agriculture
Agriculture has traditionally been one of the most difficult sectors 
to liberalize, for reasons familiar to both developed and developing 
countries. In the main, this is due to various political and political-
economy-related issues. Politicians will often resist liberalization on 
Asian Development Outlook 2006    6
the basis, among other things, of “food security,” “national security,” 
cultural preservation, the need to maintain a beautiful countryside (the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture), and health-related issues. While 
some of these arguments may be legitimate in theory, in practice they 
tend not to be. Instead, they are often merely finely wrapped excuses 
hiding old-fashioned protectionism. 
Farm lobbies are extremely strong in most developed countries, 
especially the EU, US, and Japan. It is an easy application of the political 
economy of protectionism (see, for example, Baldwin 1982); farmers tend 
to be geographically concentrated, have a well-defined producer interest, 
and can use politically popular slogans to mask the higher prices, fiscal 
cost, and other distortions created by agricultural protectionism. Less 
than 5% of the labor force is employed in agriculture in developed 
countries. Yet protection of this sector in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) costs over $300 billion a year 
(a multiple of the value of development assistance, for example) and has 
often caused modest results in trade negotiations of all kinds. Disputes 
pertaining to trade in agriculture almost scuttled the Uruguay Round; 
it was in part responsible for the failure at Cancun in 2003, and experts 
who are skeptical about the future of Doha generally point to the 
powerful protectionist forces in this area. 
The Uruguay Round was not particularly successful in liberalizing 
farm trade. Today, the level of agricultural protection in the OECD 
countries is still close to its level in 1986–1988, the reference years used by 
the Uruguay Round negotiators. Nevertheless, the Uruguay Round was 
instrumental in introducing the minimal level of transparency necessary 
to prepare for profound future changes in OECD agricultural markets.8 
In particular, it helped to place farm liberalization at the forefront of the 
Doha negotiations and reinforced the steady decline of OECD public 
support for a highly subsidized farm sector. 
Moreover, the emergence of developing countries as key negotiators 
at Doha has also helped place agriculture at the top of the agenda. Net 
exporters of farm products with a long-term comparative advantage in 
agriculture, such as Brazil or Thailand, have been effective in applying 
and organizing pressure at Doha for agricultural liberalization. And many 
other developing countries have realized that they are at the stage where 
farm exports are essential to their development because their farm sector 
is large and labor intensive. Agriculture accounts for 40% of GDP, 35% of 
exports, and 50–70% of total employment in LDCs (12%, 15%, and 15–40%, 
respectively, in the other developing countries). Three quarters of the 
world’s poorest people live in rural areas, with the proportion in LDCs as 
high as 90%. This being the Doha Development Agenda, agriculture must 
be part of a final package. 
Farm negotiations in the Doha Round are taking place under three 
pillars: (i) rules on export subsidies; (ii) rules on domestic support; and 
(iii) tariff cuts. This structure is a source of difficulty in negotiation 
because the use of these instruments is asymmetrical. Most OECD 
countries use all three instruments, while developing countries protect 
their farm sector only behind tariffs. Negotiating on the combined 
effects of these instruments would be ideal, but is not technically 
possible. 
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Export subsidy elimination
The Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China confirmed the need 
to eliminate farm export subsidies by 2013 (2006 for cotton export 
subsidies). This decision has received considerable publicity, despite the 
fact that export subsidies only represent roughly 5–6% of total farm 
subsidies, and that it simply binds the reduction of export subsidies 
unilaterally undertaken by the EU since the late 1990s.9 Nevertheless, 
economic calculations, e.g., Anderson and Martin (2006), have shown 
that eliminating export subsidies without cutting tariffs and domestic 
support will generate noticeable welfare losses in many of the developing 
countries that are net importers of subsidized farm products. These 
calculations have also consistently shown that the only way to (more 
than) counterbalance this negative impact is to reduce domestic support 
and tariff rates in order to boost world production.
In the export subsidies domain, the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration may prepare for future WTO negotiations by expanding the 
definition of export subsidies to include the export subsidy elements of 
export credits, food aid, and state trading enterprises. These instruments 
are currently of marginal importance (Hoekman and Messerlin 2006); 
nevertheless, such disciplines are significant in inhibiting their intensive 
use in the future, perhaps to fill the void left by the elimination of 
existing export subsidies. 
Domestic support
Domestic support is an area where the OECD countries have de facto 
benefited from a “reverse” special and differential treatment (SDT) under 
the Uruguay Round. Whereas there is an outright legal prohibition 
against trade-distorting subsidies in manufacturing (and countries 
importing subsidized goods are allowed to impose countervailing duties), 
in agriculture domestic support is only disciplined by rules against highly 
distorting subsidies and practices. These tend to be extremely expensive, 
which explains to some extent why only developed countries tend to use 
them. The US and EU together represented over three fourths of global 
farm domestic support in the early 2000s (Anderson et al. 2006a). 
Table 1.5.4 presents the reform proposals put forward by the EU, G20, 
and US at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, focusing on 
the two largest subsidizers, the EU and US. It shows that the proposed 
subsidy cuts (applied to Uruguay Round commitments) may look huge 
in percentage terms, but in effect they reflect a good deal of “water” 
in the subsidies. For instance, the EU has made a proposal, which is a 
mere binding at WTO of its already-completed reforms of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) undertaken since 2000 (Kutas 2006). 
The EU approach in particular has been very much criticized for 
several reasons. First, there is a long WTO tradition (that the EU has 
always supported) that unilateral liberalization should not be credited as 
WTO concessions. Second, the EU proposal in farm tariff cuts is viewed 
as weak (see below) whereas its requests for tariff cuts in NAMA are 
substantial (see above). Last, but not least, the 2003 CAP reform did not 
really liberalize the EU farm sector. All other things being constant, the 
overall level of EU protection has decreased marginally from 57% to 56% 
after the 2003 reform (OECD 2004). 
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1.5.4 Farm domestic support in the United States and European Union
Unit US EU
The Amber Box (the most trade-distorting subsidies)   
Uruguay Round commitments $ billion 19 89
Effective amounts in 2004 $ billion 13 42
Estimated amounts in 2006–2010 (EU CAP) $ billion — 26
Doha proposals
EU proposal % cut 60 70
US proposal % cut 60 83
G20 proposal % cut 70 80
EU proposal $ billion 8 27
US proposal $ billion 8 15
G20 proposal $ billion 6 18
Overall trade-distorting support (sum of AMS, de minimis and Blue Box)
Uruguay Round commitments $ billion 55 149
Effective amounts in 2004 $ billion 23 74
Estimated amounts in 2006–2010 (EU CAP) $ billion — 40
Doha proposals in terms of subsidy cuts
EU proposal % cut 60 70
US proposal % cut 53 75
G20 proposal % cut 75 80
EU proposal $ billion 22 45
US proposal $ billion 26 37
G20 proposal $ billion 14 30
— = not available; CAP = Common Agricultural Policy.
Notes:
Amber box—contains a list of subsidies that WTO members have agreed to reduce under the WTO 
agriculture negotiations. 
Blue box—a category of domestic subsidies specific to the Agreement on Agriculture permitted only 
because thay are believed to distort trade less than amber box subsidies. 
AMS—Aggregate Measure of Support. An index that measures the monetary value of the extent of 
government support to a sector. 
De minimis—minimum threshold below which spending on domestic support does not need to be 
included in AMS classification. 
Sources: EU, US, and G20 proposals at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China; Penn 2005; Jales 
and Nassar 2006; Kutas 2006.
Tariff cuts and the “Big Bargain”
Tariff cuts are crucial to agricultural liberalization because they are the 
best way to reduce and control subsidies, as lower tariffs make existing 
subsidies more visibly expensive.10 Unfortunately, the ongoing Doha 
negotiations on farm tariff cuts face a much more complicated format 
than did the NAMA negotiations, with the risk they will reduce the level 
of ambition in farm liberalization, already fragile because of the political 
importance of the farm sector to almost every WTO member.
First, complicated modalities in farm negotiations flow from the fact 
that the proposals on tariff cuts for the Ministerial Meeting in Hong 
Kong, China have adopted a tiered format, with four ranges of tariffs, 
each range being subjected to a different percentage cut, as shown in 
Table 1.5.5. These proposals differ with respect to the figures defining 
the various ranges and percentage cuts. As a result, negotiators need to 
strike deals on the three thresholds defining the four tariff ranges, on 
the four percentage cuts for each range, and on the use and definition 
of a tariff cap. If there are different cuts for developed and developing 
countries (an almost certain situation), negotiators have to agree on 16 
figures at least, which is no mean feat. The fact that “specific tariffs” 
(i.e., a tariff based on a fixed value and/or quantity, rather than a 
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percentage-based “ad valorem” tariff, which are almost always applied 
in manufactures) exist on agricultural products complicates matters, as 
they would likely need to be converted to an ad valorem equivalent in 
order to be liberalized. This presents a problem in that the conversion 
can lead to greater protection.11 
Such a difficult format for negotiators could prove counterproductive. 
Thus, there is a strong incentive to look for more simplified parameters 
for negotiations, keeping in mind that the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration (paragraph 24) says: “[..] we instruct our negotiators to ensure 
that there is a comparably high level of ambition in market access for 
Agriculture and NAMA.” Importing the Swiss formula from NAMA to 
the farm negotiations seems a first condition to ensure a comparably 
high level of ambition by using the same instrument for tariff cuts in 
farm and NAMA negotiations. There is no extra cost for such a move; 
the Swiss formula requires that specific tariffs be transformed into ad 
valorem tariffs, but this exercise will be necessary anyway for the tiered 
proposals articulated at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China. A 
Swiss formula approach would have the same advantages of transparency 
and symmetry as in the case of NAMA, to much greater effect given 
the greater divergence in tariff rates within and between countries in 
agriculture. It would also be instrumental in setting the stage for effective 
future WTO rounds and would reduce the “exceptionalist” mentality 
regarding agriculture that has always accompanied WTO negotiations. 
Finally, the Swiss formula opens the possibility of a clearer linkage 
between the NAMA and farm negotiations; that is, it opens the door to a 
transparent “Big Bargain” with trade in goods. 
In sum, Doha negotiations particularly in the areas of domestic 
support and tariff cuts continue to be controversial, and the outcome is 
unclear. However, past experience has shown that developing countries 
in particular are placing a high priority on this area. An underestimation 
of the seriousness of developing countries in this regard was in evidence 
at the Cancun Ministerial Meeting, at which a compromise agreement 
Table 1.5.5 Tabled proposals on farm tariff cuts, 2005
EU proposal G20 proposal US proposal
Definition of the 
tiers (%)
Tariff cut (%) Definition (%) Tariff cut (%) Definition (%) Tariff cut (%)
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developed countries     
Highest tier >90 60 >75 75 >60 85–90
Medium high 60–90 50 50–75 65 40–60 75–85
Medium low 30–60 45 20–50 55 20–40 65–75
Lowest tier 0–30 35 0–20 45 0–20 55–65
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries
Highest band >130 40 >130 40 >60 a
Medium high 80–130 35 80–130 35 40–60 a
Medium low 30–80 30 30–80 30 20–40 a
Lowest band 0–30 25 <30 25 0–20 a
Other elements of tariff rates
Cap tariff (developed countries) n.a. 100 n.a. 100 n.a. 75
Cap tariff (developing countries) n.a. 150 n.a. 150 n.a. 100
n.a. = not applicable.
a Reference to “slightly lesser reductions” without more precision.
Source: The EU, G20, and US proposals at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China.
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between the EU and US in agriculture was rejected by developing 
countries (under the leadership of the G20). This should not happen 
again. These three areas of agriculture will also have to be an important 
part of a final Doha package. 
Still, agriculture is complicated and faces strong resistance at the local 
level in developed and developing countries. As farm interests in the 
EU, for example, attempted to keep any commitments at the Ministerial 
Meeting in Hong Kong, China as modest as possible, Korean farmers 
also actively sought to influence their country’s position. However, WTO 
has matured such that it needs to tackle trade in agriculture seriously, 
unlike in the past. Doha presents an opportunity to do this, that is, to 
treat agricultural trade more like trade in manufactures, in which trade-
distorting subsidies are eliminated and tariffs are lowered and made more 
uniform. The adoption of the Swiss formula to agricultural tariffs would 
help to achieve this. 
Trade in services
Globally, services represent more than 50% of the GDP of any country, 
and more than 70% of many developed economies. International trade 
in services is becoming commensurately important; in 2003, it came to 
$1.8 trillion, about one quarter the value of merchandise trade (WTO, 
International Trade Statistics, 2004, Table 1). Although data on barriers 
to trade in services are notoriously rare and often incomplete, in-depth 
studies on specific services sectors suggest that protection in this sector 
is much higher than is the case for trade in goods, suggesting that trade 
liberalization in services has significant potential for all WTO member 
states.
While services are not included in the Doha liberalization scenario 
reviewed below using ADB’s General Equilibrium Model of Asian Trade 
(GEMAT), Francois et al. (2003) do estimate the potential gains from 
various scenarios of liberalization in services trade. Assuming a 50% 
reduction in their estimated barriers to trade in services and increasing 
returns to scale, they calculate a $68 billion global gain, double that of 
a similar reduction in protection in manufactures and about one fourth 
more than in agricultural liberalization. Developing countries almost 
gain as much as the OECD countries, with the PRC and India accounting 
for over three fourths of this share. Clearly, the potential economic gains 
from services liberalization are high. 
Nevertheless, negotiations under services have hitherto produced very 
little at Doha. As of July 2005, less than half of WTO’s member countries 
had tabled proposals of any kind. Moreover, the content of these offers 
seems thin, especially in Mode 3 (commercial presence, see Box 1.5.3), 
which is of special interest to the industrial economies, and in Mode 4 
(that is, trade in labor services), which is of special interest to some 
developing countries (for example, in Asia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Sri Lanka).
A first reason for this deadlock is the negotiating process per se, 
which is complicated in part due to measurement problems. In trade in 
goods, negotiators balance the concessions granted to trading partners 
via tariff cuts at home with those they receive in return, a straightforward 
calculation. In services, it would make little sense to balance, say, the 
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The complicated and diverse nature of trade in services 
explains why liberalization in this sector can be far more 
difficult than trade in goods. Services can be high tech or 
low tech; inputs and/or final products; publicly provided or 
privately provided; and closely related to other areas, such 
as foreign direct investment (FDI) and immigration. Trade 
in goods internationally tends to be almost always privately 
provided, with strong GATT/WTO controls on state 
intervention, including the technical prohibition against 
state subsidies and constraints in the form of state-owned 
enterprises having to abide by market principles (GATT 
Article XVII). Many services areas, however, still include 
government involvement, and state prerogatives in certain 
areas are recognized by the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS). Moreover, trade in goods tends to be 
separate from FDI, though clearly there exist indirect links 
between trade and FDI. In the area of services, however, 
trade can be intricately linked to FDI; in some subsectors, 
trade in services is impossible without FDI. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development defines four “modes” of trade in services: 
(1) cross-border supply, in which a company exports 
the service from its home country, e.g., by fax or email; 
(2) consumption abroad, in which the user of the service 
consumes it outside his/her home country, e.g., tourism; 
(3) commercial presence, in which a company directly 
supplies the service to foreign customers (this involves 
establishment of an affiliate abroad and constitutes over 
three fourths of all trade in services); and (4) presence of 
natural persons, in which the service-exporting country 
sends personnel abroad to supply services.
In the Doha Development Agenda, key areas of 
contention in trade in services relate to Mode 3 and Mode 
4, which is no doubt why little has been offered. Mode 
3 is a high priority for developed countries; in fact, after 
the “Singapore issues” were taken off the agenda after the 
2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting, Mode 3 is the main 
area in which facilitating FDI policies are being discussed. 
Liberalization in Mode 4 is an important priority for 
labor-exporting developing Asian countries, which are 
especially concerned about working visa policies and other 
immigration-related procedures in developed countries.
number of licenses granted to foreign insurance companies with the 
number of visas obtained for domestic nurses willing to work outside the 
country. Moreover, until the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, 
negotiations were exclusively based on bilateral offers and requests, a 
cumbersome procedure that complicates the negotiations. So does the 
fact that substantial services liberalization can require behind-the-border 
changes (e.g., changing a law or bureaucratic regulations). 
To simplify things, services negotiations under WTO in the past have 
focused on national treatment, that is, on the elimination of measures 
that discriminate against foreign service providers. Such an approach 
allows regulatory flexibility, but this comes at a price: there is no “forced” 
regulatory efficiency. The failure of countries to adopt “best practices” 
in this regard has been estimated to be high (OECD 2005, Estevão 
2005). In order to allow for deeper integration in the services context, 
the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China decided that countries 
could pursue services negotiations on a “plurilateral,” rather than the 
usual bilateral, basis. That is, more than two countries can negotiate 
a liberalization package in a certain sector, a result which would be 
extended on a most-favored-nation basis.12 
Although there could be some breakthroughs in the less controversial 
areas, the paucity of proposals on services thus far does not bode well for 
a breakthrough in this area. Nevertheless, it is an increasingly important 
sector with great potential. A successful conclusion to the Doha 
negotiations would also likely produce a strong commitment to focus on 
services in future rounds of multilateral negotiations. 
Rules 
The Doha discussions on “rules” focus on several issues; for developing 
1.5.3 The Four Modes of Services Liberalization
Asian Development Outlook 2006    1
Asia (and other developing regions) it is argued that the most important 
areas relate to contingent protection (antidumping and countervailing 
duties) and regional trading agreements. (Aid for trade, including trade 
facilitation, is handled in the next subsection.)
During the last decade, WTO has been unable to monitor effectively 
the use of nontariff barriers (NTBs). The success of the Uruguay Round to 
eradicate “gray measures” (such as quotas and voluntary export restraints) 
has been somewhat diminished by the increased use of contingent 
protection, especially antidumping measures. Hitherto there has been no 
major systematic effort by WTO to delineate and quantify major NTBs 
imposed by WTO member states. Table 1.5.6 provides an illustration of 
the use of antidumping duties and other NTBs gleaned from recent trade 
policy reviews13 of selected WTO members. It suggests that the NTB 
problem continues to be important.
Doha discussions on reforms addressing antidumping and 
countervailing duty procedures have not yet reached the negotiating 
stage, but such topics tend to be handled in the final negotiating phase. 
Contingent protection could represent a growing threat to open 
trade. While, technically, antidumping measures and countervailing 
duties are justifiable in certain cases, in practice they have been used as 
a protectionist tool, all the more problematic because applications are 
1.5.6 WTO notifications of nontariff barriers, selected economies
Year of 
trade 
policy 
review
Import nontariff barriers Export 
prohibition, 
restrictions, 
licensing
State-
owned 
enterprises
Import 
prohibition, 
restrictions
Contingent protection Technical 
barriers to 
trade
Sanitary, 
phytosan. 
measures
Government 
procurement
Safeguard Antidumping Countervailing
Industrial economies
Japan 2004 Low Yes 0 0 Low Low Low Low Low
US 2003 — Yes 85 23 High High High High Low
EU 2004 High Yes 156 18 High High High Average Low
Canada 2003 — No 43 10 High Low High High High
Australia 2002 Low No 19 5 High High High Average —
New Zealand 2003 Low Yes 0 0 High Low Low Low High
Developing economies
Korea 2004 Low Yes 21 0 Low High Average Low High
South Africa 1998 High No 35 0 Low Low High High Low
Malaysia 2005 Low No 12 0 High Low Low Low Low
Singapore 2004 Low No 0 0 Low High Low Low High
Philippines 2005 High Yes 5 0 Low Low Low Low Low
Thailand 2003 Low No 26 0 Low Low Low Low Low
Brazil 2004 High Yes 48 6 High High Low Average High
Mexico 2002 Low No 90 1 High Low Low Low Low
Indonesia 2003 Low No 7 0 Low Average Low Average Low
India 2002 High Yes 131 0 Low Low Low Low High
Least-developed countries
Bangladesh 2000 High No 0 0 Low Low Low Average Low
Notes:
Country classification is based on the Integrated Tariff Analysis System.
— = no pages devoted to the particular NTB; Low = below average number of pages devoted to the particular NTB; High = above average number of pages devoted 
to the particular NTB; Average = equal to the average number of pages devoted to the particular NTB; Yes/No = has/has not applied safeguard measures.
For Singapore and Malaysia, state-owned enterprises refer to government-linked companies; for the columns referring to antidumping and countervailing measures, 
the figures refer to the number of measures in force.
Source: Trade Policy Reviews (various issues), available: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm.
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firm- or country-specific. Enforcement of rules governing contingent 
protection has also been relatively lax. Hence, discussions regarding the 
need to make contingent protection more transparent and symmetric 
between countries will likely become a significant issue at Doha, though 
it is not clear exactly what will be put forward. Still, the regulatory nature 
of this area, as well as the increasing use of contingent protection even 
by developing countries, will render progress difficult. Little progress is 
expected in this regard outside clarification of rules, as was basically the 
case during the Uruguay Round. 
As is noted at length in Part 3, the trend toward the creation of 
preferential trade agreements (e.g., free trade areas or customs unions) 
has become increasingly important in driving international commercial 
policy over the past 10 years. By their very nature, these agreements 
discriminate in favor of partner countries, to the disadvantage of 
nonpartners. This is a violation of the heart and spirit of the GATT/
WTO, i.e., most-favored-nation treatment, enshrined in Article I. 
However, Article XXIV allows for preferential trade agreements, 
provided that they meet certain general criteria. In GATT’s early years, 
preferential trade agreements were relatively few in number. As of March 
2006, however, almost 200 such agreements had been reported to WTO, 
double that of just a decade earlier. Many more are in the works; the vast 
majority of developing Asian countries are party to such agreements. 
Recognizing that this trend poses an important challenge to 
nondiscrimination, WTO members have been discussing the need 
to revamp the organization’s policies toward regionalism. The 1994 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT was an 
attempt to enhance the compatibility of regionalism with multilateralism 
at a time when the trend was beginning to grow, but it did little to 
clarify the issues. Under the Doha Development Agenda, further 
revisions of interpretations of Article XXIV were to be part of its “single 
undertaking.” But little was accomplished at the Ministerial Meeting in 
Hong Kong, China in this regard, except a commitment to improve the 
transparency of free trade areas and encouragement to negotiators to 
arrive at “appropriate outcomes” by the end of 2006. 
Because the global trend toward bilateralism and regionalism is new 
and just about all WTO member countries are involved, it is unlikely 
that substantial progress will be made in this area at Doha, outside 
of some minor points on definitions and transparency. However, the 
problems that are being created by this trend—such as inevitable trade 
and investment diversion, “noodle bowl ” (or “spaghetti bowl”) issues, 
and the clear threat to the multilateral system—will become evident 
in time, and the threat to the multilateral system will be taken more 
seriously. This will no doubt be a key area of discussion in subsequent 
rounds, if not sooner. 
Special and differential treatment and aid for trade
The 6 years between the ministerial meetings held in Seattle and 
Hong Kong, China witnessed an intense debate on whether and 
how developing countries should be granted special and differential 
treatment (SDT). Importantly, at the Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, 
China developed countries agreed to end tariffs and quotas on 97% of 
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the tariff lines exported by the LDCs by 2008. This was hailed as an 
important success. However, it has been criticized as not being extensive 
enough.14 
To begin, it should be noted that the pursuit of SDT has often been 
counterproductive for developing countries. As noted above, countries 
tend to gain most from their own liberalization, and the quest for 
exclusions, drawn-out timetables for the implementation of reform, and 
lack of active participation in global trade talks (meaning that protection 
remains relatively high in LDCs) have postponed or even stifled 
liberalization. The possibility of a “round for free” was discussed earlier 
in the Doha talks, ostensibly suggesting that LDCs should be exempt 
from everything at Doha. This approach, though well meaning, would 
have been highly detrimental to LDC development, as it would have 
precluded the need for domestic reform and restructuring. Moreover, 
active participation ensures that the issues they really care about will 
be addressed. Some aspects of SDT can be useful, but in no way should 
it serve to exclude LDCs and developing countries more generally from 
being true partners in the global trading system.
Since the 1970s, SDT has been mostly delivered through preferential 
(low or zero) tariffs granted to a limited number of developing countries 
defined on an ad hoc basis by developed countries (on an individual 
basis). However, the value of SDT preferences has been falling over 
time. For example, beneficiaries are currently suffering from “preference 
erosion” and associated adjustment costs. During the last decade, 
the differences between the most-favored-nation tariff rates and the 
preferential tariff rates have been reduced by a long series of trade 
agreements, under the GATT/WTO and in regional trade agreements. 
“Aid for trade” has become a buzzword in the Doha negotiations, and 
as a result, deserves to be defined with some precision. The preference 
erosion issue, for example, is often included under the aid for trade 
heading. What follows limits aid for trade to issues increasingly related to 
governance in general (and not necessarily to trade directly).
First, aid for trade can be linked to “trade facilitation,” that is, to the 
activities undertaken by customs and logistics procedures, e.g., improving 
the movement, release, and clearance of goods, including goods in transit. 
The Doha Development Agenda has a program of negotiations on trade 
facilitation intended to buttress developing-country capacity to implement 
trade liberalization and structural change in general. A particularly 
important aspect of this program relates to transit conditions (for 
example, fees, delays, and transparency), which is of prime importance to 
landlocked countries.
Second, as the above definition of trade facilitation is quite narrow 
(it covers only public governance at the borders), this approach could 
potentially be extended to all activities involved in the international 
movement of goods and services, such as building the corresponding 
infrastructure (ports, roads, and other transport facilities), or operating 
trade-related services (mail and parcels, telecoms, specialized legal and 
insurance services, storage, and the like). This “trade facilitation plus” 
concept is very close to services negotiations since de facto it relies on a 
cluster of services on which developing countries need to focus in order 
to reap effectively gains from trade liberalization. 
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Gauging the gains of Doha trade liberalization 
for the region 
Viewed from a historical perspective, global free trade would appear an 
idealistic goal. As noted above, negotiations in the Doha Development 
Agenda have focused on a more modest agenda. To conjecture about 
the outcome in Doha, this section examines the economic impact in the 
context of a model that brings Asia into sharper relief. This exercise is 
conducted using an Asia- and trade-focused general equilibrium model 
(GEMAT), described more fully in Part 3.
Since the parameters (and, indeed, likelihood) of an agreement 
at Doha remains uncertain, the simulations adopt the ambitious 
assumptions about Doha outcomes that have been made by Anderson 
et al. (2006b) (Box 1.5.4). While a successful Doha package could spur 
further multilateral liberalization initiatives, these are not considered 
here. 
Under the “Deep Doha” scenario, world income rises by $155.2 billion 
in 2025, measured in 2001 prices (Table 1.5.7). However, liberalization 
benefits developing Asia disproportionately. Around 70% of the estimated 
gains from Deep Doha accrue to Asia (including Japan). Box 1.5.5 
compares ADB current estimates with those of earlier World Bank 
studies. Caveats about these exercises and their estimates are set out in 
Part 3. Importantly, as is further discussed in Part 3, the absolute values 
of these estimates tend to have a strong downward bias, and, of course, 
are a function of the assumptions and parameters underlying the model. 
Hence, the absolute values are arguably less important than the rank 
ordering of the results and the relative magnitudes. 
As Table 1.5.7 shows, the estimated gains from Doha are not evenly 
distributed either globally or within Asia. The disproportionately large 
gains accruing to Asia follow from Asia’s openness and larger initial 
trade shares, as well as the assumption of a significant reduction in Asian 
import protection, especially in agriculture. Japan and Korea, which are 
large economies in absolute size, capture the bulk of the gains. Relative to 
income, Korea and Thailand gain most. Korea benefits significantly from 
a sharp reduction in its own agricultural tariffs as well as from growing 
export opportunities in the PRC. Thailand benefits as its agricultural 
exports are boosted by reduced distortions in the global agricultural 
trading system. 
Although Deep Doha is a positive sum game, there are prospective 
losers as well as winners. In Asia, Bangladesh and Viet Nam would 
appear to face the prospect of income losses. And Deep Doha would 
appear to offer no benefits to the Philippines and few to the PRC. As 
the possibility of prospective losses may impede or slow multilateral 
liberalization initiatives, it is important to look behind these results. 
An important aspect of the Doha negotiations, reflected in this 
scenario, is that negotiations are about reductions in members’ legally 
bound tariffs, not the actual tariffs that they apply. Therefore, where there 
is water in the tariffs, nominal reductions in bound tariffs may mean little 
or no reduction in actual levels. In the Deep Doha scenario assumptions 
presented here, this is the case for both Bangladesh and the Philippines. 
An important result from standard economic theory is that liberalization 
1.5.7 Welfare gains from Deep Doha 
(change compared to baseline in 2025)
Real 
income  
($ billion)
Real 
income  
(% of GDP)
Japan 21.26 0.33
China, People’s Rep. of 11.57 0.21
Korea 36.76 3.49
Hong Kong, China 4.90 1.19
Taipei,China 5.32 0.79
Indonesia 2.98 0.57
Malaysia 3.20 1.09
Philippines 0.22 0.09
Singapore 3.47 1.67
Thailand 8.47 2.14
Viet Nam -0.79 -0.58
Bangladesh -0.03 -0.02
India 12.50 0.67
Sri Lanka 0.24 0.54
Developing Asia 88.81 0.76
Asia including Japan 110.07 0.61
United States 8.13 0.04
Europe 19 32.56 0.24
Australia and 
New Zealand
3.43 0.38
Latin America 2.15 0.05
Rest of the world -1.13 -0.02
World Total 155.20 0.24
Note: Europe 19 comprises 15 countries of the 
EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and 
Switzerland.
Source: Staff estimates.
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Deep Doha. This is essentially scenario 5 in Anderson et al. 
(2006).1 It assumes significant agreement in Doha by 2006 in 
a number of areas: nonagricultural tariff bindings are cut by 
50%, and agricultural tariffs are cut using a tiered formula. The 
marginal cut is set at 45% for agricultural tariffs below 15%, 
70% for tariffs within the 15–90% bracket, and 75% for tariffs 
above 90%.2 Agricultural export subsidies are eliminated for 
all countries. Domestic support for agriculture is also cut for 
the United States (by 28%), the European Union (by 16%), and 
Australia and New Zealand (by 10%). Special and differential 
treatment (SDT) is not applied and developing countries are 
assumed to liberalize to the same degree as developed coun-
tries. All these trade reforms are phased in over the 5-year 
period of 2007–2011. Possible reforms in services sector and 
trade facilitation are not incorporated in this scenario. 
Doha-SDT. This scenario examines the consequences of 
including SDT. Specifically, there are four agricultural tariff 
brackets for developing countries, with inflexion points placed 
at tariff levels of 20%, 60%, and 120%. Their marginal rates 
of reduction are 35%, 40%, 50%, and 60% within each of 
the four bands. On NAMA, the cut in nonagricultural tariff 
bindings for developing countries is 33%. Least-developed 
countries are not required to undertake any reduction com-
mitment. On the other hand, the required reductions in both 
agriculture and nonagriculture sectors for developed coun-
tries are the same as that in the Deep Doha scenario. The 
assumption regarding cuts in domestic support and export 
subsidies are also the same as those in Deep Doha.
Doha-SDT excluding sensitive agricultural products. 
Building on Doha-SDT, this “Doha Light” scenario further 
assumes a less ambitious agricultural agenda that excludes 
sensitive farm products. The developed countries are 
assumed to treat 2% of their HS6 agricultural tariff lines as 
sensitive and subject to just a 15% tariff cut. For developing 
countries, the corresponding figure is 4%.
1 See Anderson et al. (2006b) for the details of the design of this Doha 
scenario. The Doha scenario used here corresponds to their “Doha-All” 
scenario.
2 Since the cut is applied on bound tariffs, the cuts in applied rate may 
be small for some developing countries due to binding overhang.
gains depend largely on the boosts to efficiency and productivity that 
occur when countries liberalize their own trade (Figure 1.5.1), not from 
tariff reductions by their trade partners. By volunteering cuts in bound 
tariff rates that would lower applied tariffs, countries such as Bangladesh 
and the Philippines would also benefit. The negotiating approaches of 
WTO obfuscate this fundamental point.
Of course, even if countries do reduce their own tariffs, multilateral 
liberalization may not lead to gains in all cases. If liberalization means 
that a country loses preferential access to important markets, or export 
subsidies are removed on goods that have a large weight in the import 
basket, or subsidized entry into other markets is halted (as, for example, 
in the case of the Fiji Islands’ sugar exports to the EU), countries may 
face the prospect of significant losses. The model suggests that the erosion 
of preferential access for clothing and textiles to the EU, with the EU 
lowering its most-favored-nation tariffs, could dampen Bangladesh’s 
exports, resulting in losses in income and terms of trade. Bangladesh 
also loses from terms-of-trade effects driven by higher agricultural prices 
(including cotton). Also, given that the PRC already has substantially 
reduced its tariffs on merchandise trade, a deterioration of its terms 
of trade may be needed to sustain fast export growth. The case of Viet 
Nam, which is not yet a member of WTO, illustrates another point. In 
the Doha scenario, levels of protection in nonmember countries are 
assumed unchanged. Consequently, as WTO member countries liberalize, 
nonmember countries such as Viet Nam suffer from a diversion of 
their trade to other locations where costs are now lower. If Viet Nam 
successfully concludes negotiations to enter WTO, it too would benefit 
from Doha, raising estimated impacts. 
Under the scenario of Doha-SDT (Table 1.5.8), the global gain in 2025 
shrinks by around 30% in comparison with the Deep Doha scenario, to 
1.5.1 Tariff reductions and income gains
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Post-DohaPre-Doha
Sri Lanka
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Thailand
Singapore
Philippines
Malaysia
Indonesia
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Hong Kong, China
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Japan
Average merchandise tariff
%
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Sri Lanka
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Hong Kong, China
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PRC
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Gains in real income, 2025
% of GDP
Sources: GTAP database 6.05; CEPII scenarios; staff 
estimates.
1.5.4 Various Doha scenarios
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$110.6 billion. But for developing countries,15 the gain would 
be only $56.4 billion, only 63% of that in the Deep Doha 
scenario. If higher-income Asian countries (Hong Kong, 
China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China) are excluded, 
the gain of developing countries is only $19.3 billion, or less 
than half of that in the Deep Doha scenario (Figure 1.5.2). 
This exercise suggests that no regions (as defined) would 
be better off from the introduction of SDT, even for LDCs 
like Bangladesh. This result squares with the theoretical 
proposition that developing countries need to cut their 
own trade protection to reap the benefits of multilateral 
trade liberalization. SDT does not serve the interests of 
developing countries. 
If the Doha-SDT scenario is further weakened by 
assuming that the sensitive agricultural products are 
subject to lower tariff cuts, global gains in 2025 would 
be reduced to $68.4 billion, reflecting the importance of 
agricultural liberalization in the Doha trade liberalization 
agenda. In Asia, the exception of sensitive agricultural 
products are important for Japan, Korea, Thailand, and, 
to a lesser extent, Viet Nam, given their high interests in 
agricultural trade liberalization. However, for other Asian 
economies, the exception of sensitive agricultural products 
only have marginal impacts on their welfare gains from 
Doha.
Beyond Doha
The outcome at Doha is uncertain. It is hard to predict at 
this point whether there will be a successful package that 
emerges in time for the April 2006 deadline, whether the 
deadline will be extended and subsequently completed, or whether the 
negotiations will fail. Moreover, it is unclear what the package will look 
like. Will it be a comprehensive set of liberalization initiatives or “Doha 
Light”? 
In terms of economics, Doha Light could potentially be worse than a 
failure at Doha. For example, a “flexible” package under NAMA in which 
many sensitive products are excluded, minimal “value added” in terms 
of progress in agriculture, and mere rhetoric in services and “rules,” 
with some compensation under “aid for trade,” is not an inconceivable 
outcome. However, it would be regrettable. First, nonuniform tariff cuts 
could lead to distortions in the value-added chain that could potentially 
negate any gains from liberalization. Mere patchwork in agriculture 
would repeat the mistakes of previous GATT/WTO rounds, since it 
would thwart necessary structural reform in developed and developing 
countries, and would leave much for future rounds (discussed below). 
And lack of progress in reforming contingent protection rules would 
leave fully loaded an important (and increasingly dangerous) protectionist 
weapon. 
From a political perspective, Doha Light might be considered 
preferable to no agreement at all, as it would at least be a “success” 
1.5.8 Welfare gains from two less ambitious Doha scenarios 
(change compared to baseline in 2025, real income)
Doha-SDT Doha-SDT excluding 
sensitive farm 
products
($ billion) (% of 
GDP)
($ billion) (% of 
GDP)
Japan 18.57 0.29 7.86 0.12
China, People’s Rep. of 10.11 0.18 9.00 0.16
Korea 26.93 2.55 10.69 1.01
Hong Kong, China 3.52 0.85 3.42 0.83
Taipei,China 4.00 0.59 3.89 0.58
Indonesia 2.08 0.40 2.10 0.40
Malaysia 1.67 0.57 1.47 0.50
Philippines 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.05
Singapore 2.57 1.24 2.53 1.22
Thailand 5.87 1.49 3.71 0.94
Viet Nam -0.71 -0.52 -0.48 -0.35
Bangladesh -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06
India 6.32 0.34 6.25 0.33
Sri Lanka 0.13 0.29 0.06 0.14
Developing Asia 62.52 0.54 42.67 0.37
Asia including Japan 81.09 0.45 50.53 0.28
United States 6.81 0.03 6.82 0.03
Europe 19 26.09 0.19 19.61 0.15
Australia and New 
Zealand
2.74 0.31 1.69 0.19
Latin America -0.45 -0.01 -1.14 -0.03
Rest of the world -5.72 -0.08 -8.88 -0.12
World Total 110.56 0.17 68.64 0.11
SDT = special and differential treatment.
Note: Europe 19 comprises 15 countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway, and Switzerland.
Source: Staff estimates.
1.5.2 Gains from Doha scenarios:  
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and could keep momentum going for the next round, an important 
consideration given the rise in regionalism. However, this is purported 
to be a development round; lack of progress in comparative-advantage 
areas for developing countries would reinforce the impression in some 
circles that the international trading system is rigged against the poor. 
Enthusiasm for global trade could wane, and the regionalism trend could 
actually be reinforced.
But a comprehensive Doha package would likely do wonders for 
the global trading system. What such a package would look like is 
Care needs to be taken in comparing different estimates of 
the potential benefits of the Doha Development Agenda. 
Over the years, the World Bank has revised its estimates 
of Doha benefits significantly downward. The estimate 
here is also lower than earlier World Bank estimates (2001 
and 2004). An important reason for this is that use of 
the GTAP V6 (Global Trade Analysis Project) database 
implies a reduction in baseline trade protection compared 
to the earlier GTAP datasets used in the initial World 
Bank studies. The benefits of the cessation of quotas on 
textiles and clothing and the entry of the People’s Republic 
of China into the World Trade Organization are now 
embedded in the baseline, so Doha assumptions now 
remove fewer distortions (van der Mensbrugghe 2006). 
But there are also technical differences between the 
estimate of the General Equilibrium Model of Asian Trade 
(GEMAT) and more recent World Bank estimates. These 
differences illustrate the sensitivity of model estimates to 
differences in technological and behavioral specifications, 
and parametric assumptions. In particular, estimated 
benefits are sensitive to assumptions about trade price 
elasticities (Armington elasticities), returns to scale and 
product variety, and to sector and geographic aggregation. 
The most recent World Bank estimates are based on 
trade price elasticities that are about one third higher than 
those used here. The elasticities in GEMAT are closer to 
the traditional GTAP values, which have been estimated 
econometrically (Hertel et al. 2003). This difference in 
parameter assumptions tends to boost the World Bank’s 
estimates of trade benefits. 
On the other side of the coin, GEMAT’s assumption 
of increasing returns and imperfect competition generates 
larger benefits than those derived in a perfect competition 
model with constant returns technology, such as that used 
by the World Bank. Aggregation also matters. Higher 
commodity and geographic aggregation in GEMAT cuts 
estimated benefits. For essentially an identical scenario, 
GEMAT’s construction trims about 15% of the global 
benefits reported in recent World Bank studies.1 
A recent study by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute shows that ambitious Doha round 
trade liberalization can induce a global real income gain 
of $104 billion in 2019, around 0.19% of world GDP in 
2019. This study was conducted using MIRAGE, a global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model which also 
incorporates scale economy and firm-level productivity 
variety (Bchir et al. 2002). The lower estimates, in 
comparison with the GEMAT results, may be due to its 
assumption about the imperfect mobility of unskilled labor 
between agricultural and nonagricultural activities, which 
limits the gains from more efficient resource reallocation. 
Another recent study by Polaski (2006) (the “Carnegie 
model”), using a static global CGE model, estimates 
global gains of $58.6 billion, or 0.19% of 2001 world 
GDP, according to its Central Doha scenario. This gain is 
larger than the equivalent static impact in GEMAT. The 
difference may be found in scenario design and model 
specification. The Central Doha scenario in Polaski (2006) 
assumes relatively modest agricultural trade liberalization 
and more ambitious manufacturing trade liberalization, 
which would induce larger gains from manufacturing 
liberalization and smaller gains from agricultural 
liberalization. Moreover, Polaski (2006) assumes 
unemployment in the urban unskilled labor market and 
a rural-urban wage differential in developing countries. 
This further magnifies the gains of some developing 
countries from manufacturing trade liberalization, as their 
manufacturing sector expands following the increased 
export opportunities induced by trade liberalization, but 
may induce losses for developing countries from Doha 
agricultural liberalization, which diverts unskilled labor 
away from manufacturing and into agriculture. 
Simulation approaches clearly have limitations and 
until there is better information, estimates of the benefits 
of trade liberalization will necessarily be subject to 
important qualifications. However, the relative magnitude 
of the welfare impacts and the sources of gains and losses 
obtained from these modeling exercises do provide useful 
insights for policy analysis.
1 For Asian countries, the estimated income gains from GEMAT 
are generally larger than the World Bank estimates, reflecting that 
the impacts of low trade elasticities are more than offset by the 
introduction of scale and variety effects.
1.5.5 Gains from Doha: A Comparison with other quantitative estimates
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outlined above: a balanced Swiss formula applied to both NAMA and 
agriculture with as few excluded sectors as possible; some progress in 
services, particularly in terms of Mode 3 and Mode 4; fairer and more 
transparent rules on contingent protection; better definitions and rules 
on transparency in regional trade agreements, as well as commitments to 
develop means to ensure that Article XXIV agreements will be consistent 
with multilateralism; and generous offers in terms of “aid for trade” and 
“trade facilitation plus.” Certainly, this scenario is far more sensitive at 
the national political level. 
Perhaps the negotiated outcome will be a combination of these two 
scenarios. Given the stakes for Asia, the region’s WTO member countries 
should be proactive in molding the negotiations in favor of the latter 
scenario. Above it is argued that the unique situation of Asia suggests that 
it has strong leadership potential. Hopefully, the political will to assume 
such a role will be forthcoming.
What will the global trading system need to tackle in future WTO 
rounds? As the Doha outcome is still unknown, prediction is doubly 
difficult. However, it is suggested that the following six areas will be 
important features of the next round: 
1. As the Swiss formula under NAMA will likely achieve a good deal 
of progress, it will be the least controversial area, at least relative to earlier 
rounds. Average tariffs are already quite low; Doha should reduce them 
further and create greater symmetry. Mega-tariffs should be a thing of 
the past. Hence, reductions in tariffs in manufactures will likely be on 
the agenda but will not be as important as in previous rounds. Could 
a complete phaseout of tariffs in developed countries be a goal? And 
perhaps 10% maximum tariffs in developing countries?
2. Regardless of the outcome of current negotiations, agriculture 
will still be important. How important will depend on progress made at 
Doha. Export subsidies will be gone, but tariffs will continue to be high 
and domestic support trade-inhibiting. The next round will seek to lower 
tariffs and put further constraints on domestic support. This sector will 
continue to be difficult; reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy 
will be particularly significant in defining the next round’s potential. 
3. Given the importance of the services sector and the fact that it 
will likely see modest progress at best at Doha, this will be one of the 
most important focus areas at the next round. It will require significant 
preparation, as trade in services is extremely complex. But as a priority, it 
should receive considerable attention. And its potential to stimulate trade 
appears to be even greater than that in agriculture and manufactures. 
4. Trade and investment issues, trade and competition policy, 
government procurement, and trade facilitation will also be a high 
priority on the negotiation agenda. These were known prior to Cancun 
as the “Singapore issues.” However, they proved too controversial for the 
Doha Development Agenda. Indeed, the failure at Cancun was blamed 
on them (and lack of progress in agriculture) and they were subsequently 
dropped, with the exception of trade facilitation. Look for them to be 
reincorporated, particularly since they continue to be a high priority for 
developed countries (as is evident by their incorporation in bilateral free 
trade areas with developing countries). Aid for trade, in particular trade 
facilitation, will also become a more salient feature of the global talks. 
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5. Contingent protection will also receive much higher priority in 
the future. Since there is not much hope that significant progress will 
be reached in controlling (particularly) antidumping and countervailing 
duties, countries will no doubt try to use them in order to protect sectors 
facing significant structural change due to liberalization in agriculture 
and manufactures. Moreover, by the next round, the PRC’s transition 
period will be over (precluding the imposition of import quotas on its 
exports of textiles and clothing, recently applied so firmly by, especially, 
the EU and US) and new, labor-abundant, competitive economies like 
Viet Nam should be full-fledged members. The trend toward greater 
usage of contingent protection will surely continue, and its threat to 
international trade will become increasingly significant. 
6. The most important area will probably pertain to regional 
and bilateral free trade areas. As noted above and more extensively 
documented in Part 3 of Asian Development Outlook 2006, regionalism 
has been growing rapidly, with Asia becoming an active and enthusiastic 
participant. This trend will likely continue for at least another few years. 
At that time, the trade effects of these agreements will start to be felt, 
and the costs associated with the “spaghetti bowl” will be increasingly 
recognized. The need for more effective rules and best-practices will 
become increasingly evident. 
To conclude, much is at stake at Doha for Asia and the world. Much 
is riding on a successful outcome. The negotiators have their hands full, 
as the issues are complex and controversial in some quarters. But with 
the right leadership and political will, a successful conclusion to the Doha 
Development Agenda is certainly feasible.
Two final remarks on the strategies of developing Asia in Doha. First, 
there is no “round for free”; active participation is not an option but a 
necessary condition to reap the gains from multilateral negotiations. 
This is because offering to liberalize hitherto protected sectors allows not 
only for concessions in exchange but also for gains from trade. Countries 
tend to gain most from their own liberalization. Second, developing 
member countries of ADB that are not yet members of WTO need to 
focus on accession. Without WTO membership, they will never fully be 
able to take advantage of the new trade architecture that is being created. 
Even if they receive most-favored-nation status or even preferential 
treatment from key trading partners, they are still outside the system. 
And one cannot change the system from outside. Moreover, a focus on 
WTO accession means that negotiating capacities—often limited in the 
developing member countries—should not be diverted to other areas, 
for example, in negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements. The 
opportunity cost is too high. 
Endnotes
1 For example, tariff cuts on capital goods imports have been very successful in past rounds, 
whereas textiles and clothing remain highly protected in countries that do not have a 
comparative advantage in this area. Since textiles and clothing use capital goods in the 
production process, this reduction in input costs will have the tendency to increase the 
protection of value added in the textile and clothing industry, thereby creating an incentive 
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for additional resources to be allocated to this inefficient sector. This is known as the 
problem of the “effective rate of protection” in economics. 
2 Per capita income will be the most likely criterion used to determine whether a country 
should benefit from “special and differential treatment.” 
3 More specifically, the G10 is opposed to substantial opening in agriculture; the G33 
supports easy exceptions from liberalization, e.g., via the notions of special products or 
safeguards; the G20 focuses on the opening of the farm markets of developed countries; and 
the Cairns Group is dedicated to global opening of agricultural markets. 
4 As the welfare costs of tariffs increase disproportionately as the tariff level rises, larger 
reductions in the highest tariffs have a more than proportional positive effect on efficiency 
and welfare. 
5 In general, moderate tariffs provide larger revenues than high tariffs. This is in large part 
due to the decrease in import volume associated with high import prices generated by steep 
protection. The fiscal aspect of the tariff is particularly important for developing countries 
with a narrow domestic tax base.
6 “Bound” tariff rates for individual products are those that a WTO member has committed 
not to exceed in past GATT rounds or as part of their protocol of accession.
7 First, exclusions of sectors give an advantage to countries with better negotiators, creating 
an advantage for developed countries over many developing countries. Second, countries 
will likely exclude the sectors with the largest potential for trade creation. And third, the 
symmetry of liberalization imposed by the Swiss formula would be distorted.
8 It should be noted that Australia and New Zealand have liberal farm policies already in 
place.
9 The EU is by far the main user of this instrument; it accounts for more than 80% of all 
global export subsidies in agriculture. 
10 Subsidies are used in order to maintain a certain standard of living for farmers. If tariffs 
are cut, either the country needs to increase subsidies to maintain those standards, or allow 
for a reduction in living standards. The former policy would in part negate any gains from 
liberalization, whereas the latter would help achieve the necessary structural adjustment. In 
any event, if the decision is made to maintain standards by increasing subsidies, this is more 
“transparent” than tariff protection because it comes at a quantifiable fiscal cost. 
11 Arguably this happened in certain cases at the Uruguay Round, when import quotas had to 
undergo “tariffication”. 
12 Among other things, plurilateral negotiations facilitate negotiations by allowing a critical 
mass of like-minded countries to pursue liberalization in areas that would be difficult for 
other countries. This approach has already been used with success in the complex 1996 
WTO Information Technology Agreement.
13 Trade policy reviews involve periodic assessments of the trade policies of WTO member 
states. 
14 There are at least three major criticisms. First, it represents no additional commitment 
for the EU, as part of its Everything But Arms initiative has a 100% coverage, and a very 
marginal one for the US, which grants duty-free and quota-free access to its market for 83% 
of imports from LDCs. Second, the remaining 3% of tariff lines (roughly 300–400 lines) 
could easily cover all the crucial exports of most LDCs, which tend to have a limited range 
of exportable products. Third, the agreement covers only the LDCs, so excluding many 
poor countries that are not classified as LDCs. 
15 Developing countries here refer to Asian developing economies, Latin America, and the rest 
of the world.
Asian Development Outlook 2006    1
References
Anderson, Kym and Will Martin. 2006. “Scenarios for Global Trade Reform,” in 
Poverty and the WTO: Impacts of the Doha Development Agenda. Thomas 
W. Hertel and L. Alan Winters (eds.). London: Palgrave Macmillan, and 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Anderson, Kym and Will Martin (eds.). 2006. Agricultural Trade Reform and the 
Doha Development Agenda. London: Palgrave Macmillan, and Washington, 
DC: World Bank.
Anderson, Kym, Will Martin, and Ernesto Valenzuela. 2006a. “The Relative 
Importance of Global Agricultural Subsidies and Market Access.” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. February.
Anderson, Kym, Will Martin, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. 2006b. Doha 
Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for Developing Countries? World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3848. February. Washington, DC: The 
World Bank.
Baldwin, Robert. 1982. “The Political Economy of Protectionism,” in Jagdish 
Bhagwati (ed.) Import Competition and Response. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press.
Bchir, Hedi, Yvan Decreux, Jean-Louis Guerin, and Sebastien Jean. 2002. 
“MIRAGE : A Computable General Equilibrium Model for Trade Policy 
Analysis.” CEPII Working Paper, No. 17. December.
Estevão, M. 2005. “Product Market Regulation and the Benefit of Wage 
Moderation.” IMF WP/05/191. International Monetary Fund, Washington, 
DC. September.
Francois, Joseph, Hans van Meijl, and Frank van Tongeren. 2003. “Economic 
Implications of Trade Liberalization under the Doha Round.” CEPII Working 
Paper, No. 2003-20. December.
Hoekman, Bernard and Patrick Messerlin. 2006. “Removing the Exceptions of 
Agricultural Export Subsidies,” in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds.) 
Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, and Washington, DC: World Bank.
Hertel, Thomas, David Hummels, Maros Ivanic, and Roman Keeney. 2003. 
“How Confident Can We Be in CGE-Based Assessments of Free Trade 
Agreements?” GTAP Working Paper No. 26, Purdue University.
Jales, Mario and Andre Nassar. 2005. “How to Read the US and EU Proposals 
on Domestic Support to Agriculture. Bridges. Year 9, No. 10. International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva. December.
Kutas, Geraldine, 2006, “Assessing the EU-25 Negotiating Room in Domestic 
Support at the Doha Round.” Mimeo. Institute for International Trade 
Negotiations (Icone), Sao Paulo, Brazil and Groupe d’Economie Mondiale 
de Sciences Po, Paris, France.
van der Mensbrugghe, Dominique. 2006. “Estimating the Benefits of Trade 
Reform: Why Numbers Change,” in Richard Newfarmer (ed.) Trade, Doha, 
and Development: A Window into the Issues. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
OECD. 2004. Analysis of CAP Reform. Paris: OECD.
 ———. 2005. “The Benefits of Liberalizing Product Markets and Reducing Barriers 
to International Trade and Investment: The Case of the United States and 
the European Union.” ECO/WKP(2005)19. OECD, Paris. May.
Penn, J. B. 2005. “US Proposals for the Agricultural Negotiations,” Presentation 
at the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference, Hong Kong, China, December 
13-18, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/img/assets/4756/Dept_State_WTO_
Proposal_110405.pdf.
Polaski, Sandra. 2006. “Winners and Losers: Impact of the Doha Round on 
Developing Countries.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Available: www.Carnegie.Endowment.org/trade.
WTO. International Trade Statistics. 2004. Table 1.
